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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States patent statute offers exclusive rights in any new
and useful "process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter" or
new and useful improvements on existing processes, machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter.' Courts have read this
Congressional subject matter mandate broadly, to include "anything
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under the sun" developed by humans.2 Among the processes covered
by the patent statute lie a variety of innovative methods for
accounting, investment, and other business strategies.3 And among
such patentable business strategies lie a variety of methods for
sheltering income from taxation.4
Business method patents are relative newcomers to the patent
system, having been formally recognized as patentable subject matter
for a little less than a decade. Explicit realization that patentable
business methods necessarily include patentable tax shelters seems to
be even more recent. We are aware that this realization has been the
subject of controversy, and even alarm, among practitioners of tax law
- hearings have been held, opinions have been voiced, and legislative
action has been demanded The general tenor of the reaction from
the tax bar appears to be one of anxiety bordering upon panic.
But from the standpoint of patent law, none of this is particularly
startling or even especially exciting. To be sure, there has been an
enormous amount of discussion and controversy about the patenting
of business methods. Patents are typically justified as an incentive for
innovation. Numerous commentators have questioned whether such
an incentive is really needed in the area of business methods and, if an
incentive to innovation is needed, whether patents are the right
mechanism to do the job.6 But once business methods are allowed as
patentable subject matter, the presence of tax shelters among such
methods is neither much of a doctrinal novelty nor much of a surprise.
Consequently, in this article we examine certain effects of tax
shelter patents but take the existence of tax planning patents as given,
assuming that the die for such patents was cast well over a decade ago
2

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).

3 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d

1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
4 See Richard S. Gruner, When Worlds Collide: Tax Planning Method Patents
Meet Tax Practice
To Make Attorneys the Latest Patent Infringers (Oct. 21, 2006) (unpublished article,
on file with the Virginia Tax Review).
5 Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice, House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Committee on Ways
and Means, 109th Cong. 2d sess. (July 13, 2006).
6 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents
Bad for
Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, (2000); Leo J.
Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent
Protectionfor Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 61, (1999); John R. Thomas, The Patentingof the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 1139 (1999).
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and is unlikely to undergo a reversal at this late date. As a matter of
U.S. patent law, the emergence of tax planning patents was probably
inevitable and is almost certainly irreversible. Accepting the patent
status quo allows us to move to the more interesting question of how
such patents are likely to affect the firms that specialize in tax
planning and the employees who move between such firms.
In approaching these questions, we draw upon our previous work
regarding the role of intellectual property in the theory of the firm.7
We compare the emerging regime of tax investment patents with the
confidentiality regime that has prevailed for investment methods in
the tax planning industry. Moving beyond the standard costs and
benefits analysis of patents as incentives for innovation, we discuss the
likely impact of tax investment patents on the profession and industry
of tax planning. We look in particular at the mobility of tax planning
and investment professionals before and after the implementation of
tax investment patents. We argue that the advent of tax investment
patents may benefit members of the profession, as opposed to their
opportunities under the alternative regime of confidentiality. In
particular, it may lead to increased labor mobility and to greater
entrepreneurial opportunities, with the growth of a new sector of
start-ups specializing in innovative tax planning strategies. We finish
by considering the social consequences of business method patents for
tax planning strategies. We conclude that although the effects are
mixed, and potentially negative on net, there is little that one can
feasibly and desirably do within patent law to address the resulting
problems without upsetting large parts of patent law.
II.

BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

The patentability of business methods has been manifest since the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in State Street
Bank' explicitly disclaimed any prohibition on the patenting of such
methods, although the patenting of such methods clearly occurred on
an intermittent basis even prior to State Street.9 Patent doctrine had
traditionally resisted the patenting of processes that might be carried
See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis:
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL L.
REV. 575 (2007).
8 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
9 See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., 564 F.Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) (upholding an investment
system patent).
7

984

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 26:981

out in the human mind, as well as the patenting of inventions
consisting of written or printed indicia. 1° This for many years
effectively precluded the patenting of the majority of business
methods, most of which involved mental processes, written methods,
or both.11
But these prohibitions were largely eroded by the gradual
incorporation of software into the ambit of patentable subject
matter. 12 While software is at its core a set of voltages in a machine,
these are represented as a type of written code that can sometimes be
read by humans and sometimes read by machines - a functional form
of writing that "behaves."' 3 Software also frequently implements
calculations or numerical manipulations that could otherwise be
carried out in the human mind. Consequently, the acceptance of
software within patentable subject matter undermined the prohibition
on which the preclusion of business methods from patent law was also
grounded. 14 The implementation of business methods as software
cemented this outcome, such that the State Street holding was
primarily an admission of de facto practice.
This is not to say that business method patents have been placidly
accepted or even that they have become uncontroversial. In one
sense, the grant of any patent is a troubling practice; patents and other
forms of intellectual property artificially raise prices, restrain trade,
and restrict access to what would otherwise be a publicly available
good. These costs of exclusivity are typically justified as being
outweighed by the benefit of intellectual property as an incentive to
investment. 5 Without some period of legal exclusivity to recoup the
cost of investment in what would otherwise be a public good, little
investment in new innovation would occur, resulting in the
underproduction of technical and creative works.
The precise
contours of the optimal package of exclusive rights to encourage
innovation is hotly contested, as both the actual benefits and actual
costs of such a system are enormously difficult to quantify, and the
correspondence
between economic
theory and real-world
10 See Dan L. Burk, PatentingSpeech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000).
11 Id.
12 See

Dan

L. Burk, Reflections in a Darkling Glass: A

Comparative

Contemplation of the Harvard College Decision,39 CAN. Bus. L.J. 219 (2003).
13 See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
14 See Burk & McDonnell, supra
note 7.
" Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and
Economics of Intellectual Property,5 J. ECON. PERSPECriVES 3 (1991).
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implementation is highly uncertain.
Given the uncertain ratio of cost to benefit for any patent,
numerous commentators have challenged the expansion of patent law.
Some have argued that on doctrinal grounds, the patent statute
contemplates technological rather than business-oriented subject
matter. 6
Other commentators have questioned the procedural
feasibility of business method patents - the Patent Office has little
expertise in evaluating business-related innovation.17
Yet other
commentators have challenged the policy basis for such patents; there
is little evidence that development of business methods requires the
extra incentive provided by intellectual property or that the costs of
bestowing exclusive rights on such innovations will be exceeded by the
social gain in business innovation. 8
For all of these reasons, foreign patent examination corps,
especially the European Patent Office (EPO) have been fighting a
losing rearguard action to resist such patents, demanding that patent
applications have a "technical" aspect to them - a criterion intended
to exclude business methods and related subject matter.' 9 But in the
United States, given the structure of the patent system, patenting of
tax planning methods was probably inevitable once software patents
became the norm. 0 If software is patentable, some number of
software implementations will be business related, opening the door
to patenting of business methods. If business methods are patentable,
some number of those business methods will concern investment
strategies. If investment strategies are patentable, some number of
those strategies will concern tax planning. QED.
We return to this question in more detail in Part VII, where we
examine the desirability of business method patents for tax planning
strategies. Here our point is that the specific questions regarding tax
planning patents do not exist in a vacuum; they are inextricably tied to
the general questions regarding business method patenting.
Consequently, any discussion of the effects of tax planning patents
must begin by considering the effects of business method patents;
having considered the characteristics of the business method genus,
we can turn to the peculiarities of the tax planning species. We
See Thomas, supra note 6.
See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 577 (1999).
18 See Dreyfuss, supra note 6; Raskind,
supra note 6.
19 See Burk, supra note
12, at 226.
16
17

20

See id. at 225.
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approach both classes of patent from the standpoint of confidentiality
and disclosure, since these are not only key considerations in
implementing investment strategy, but are also key considerations in
justifying the patent system generally. The issue common to all these
contexts is the cost of controlling of valuable information, which
frames the discussion of tax planning patents.
III. BUSINESS PATENTS IN AN EFFICIENT MARKET

While critics have questioned how well business method patents
fit standard patent justifications, that is, regarding their ability to
provide economic incentives for innovation, the special economic
peculiarities of such patents have received less scrutiny. In particular,
desirability of investment patents may deserve consideration in light
of the efficient market hypothesis. In its strongest form, this economic
theory holds that the prices in markets reflect all the available
information concerning traded commodities, so that excess returns to
investment are impossible. Weaker forms of this hypothesis hold that
some temporary disparity between market price and actual value may
be possible, allowing some excess returns to those who have access to
better value information, but that the very activity of pursuing
undervalued commodities will cause their prices to rise, rapidly
dissipating any advantage gained from the privately-held information.
In other words, the communicative nature of prices in markets
rapidly, although perhaps not 21instantaneously, makes privately held
investment information public.
This hypothesis has important implications for investment
strategies generally and for the policy of patenting such strategies.
Investment strategies, whether patented or unpatented, are almost by
definition intended to outperform the market - there is no other
reason for the development of such strategies, since the recognized,
understood, and simple approach of buying and holding a diverse
portfolio of investment instruments would otherwise yield the optimal
See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (providing the pivotal early statement of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis). In recent years the hypothesis has undergone
something of a battering among economists. See ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000). The pivotal early
treatment within legal scholarship is Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). For a recent
evaluation of market efficiency by a variety of leading corporate law scholars, see
Symposium: Revisiting the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 499
(2003).
21
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outcome. The efficient market hypothesis predicts that attempts to
outperform an efficiently functioning market will fail. However, an
investment strategy that may be exploiting some imperfection or
inefficiency in the market may yield better returns than the market as
a whole, at least until the information about the inefficiency leaks out,
attracts other investment, and the profits from that investment
anomaly are competed away."
The question for investment strategies based upon anomalies,
then, is how quickly they will be noticed and dissipated. If the market
is sufficiently transparent, this may occur simply by observation of
pricing in the marketplace. If for some reason market pricing does
not reflect the desirability of the investment strategy, the information
may reach the marketplace through other channels - such as gossip.
Opportunism or entrepreneurship on the part of those conducting the
investment transaction may also play an important role in
disseminating information about the strategy. Employees familiar
with the strategy may personally employ it for their own benefit or
may use the information gained in the service of the firm to service
their own clients, perhaps by leaving and founding their own
brokerage. Indeed, competing investment firms may attempt to hire
experienced personnel away from their competitors in order to get the
benefit of that competitor's specialized knowledge for their own
clients.
This of course presents a problem of confidentiality for those
exploiting market anomalies.
One strategy for containing such
information leakage is to treat the investment strategy as a trade
secret, prohibiting employees from discussing it with those outside the
firm, from using the information for their own benefit, or from using
the information in the service of a new employer. Obligations of trade
secrecy arise from a number of legal sources, including a duty of
loyalty to the employer in tort and prohibitions on unjust enrichment
in the law of restitution. But a common source of trade secrecy
obligation arises out of contract, through employment of
confidentiality agreements and possibly non-competition agreements.
Some investment strategies may not target temporary inefficiencies in
generally efficient markets. They may instead be targeting markets that are very far
from being efficient markets - for instance, venture capital targets the market for
start-up companies, a market that is not close to being informationally efficient. Or,
investment strategies may be targeting opportunities due to lasting inefficiencies that
are created and maintained by governmental regulation which prevents market
corrections from occurring. The latter may be of particular relevance in thinking
about tax planning.
2
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These agreements may be used to obligate not only employees to
secrecy, but also clients who will learn of the transaction, as well as
business entities that may be involved in transactions under the
investment system.
Such agreements are common in many industries, but may be
central to preserving the profitability of investment strategies that are
profitable only so long as the market does not learn of their existence.
Yet confidentiality agreements are cumbersome to draft, to police,
and to enforce. They are also subject to the famous "information
disclosure paradox" formulated by Kenneth Arrow: the possessor of
valuable information will be reluctant to disclose information unless a
confidentiality agreement is in place, but the potential recipient of the
information will simultaneously be reluctant to sign a disclosure
agreement until he knows what information is to be disclosed.23
Consequently, Arrow predicts that disclosures under confidentiality
agreement will be impeded and often will not occur at all.
Patents present one solution to the information disclosure
paradox, by occasioning exclusive rights on the publication of an
enabling disclosure of the claimed invention.24 An important factor in
the calculus of patent benefits is the public benefit of disclosure. In
order to obtain a patent, the applicant must disclose the claimed
invention in sufficient detail that one of ordinary skill in the pertinent5
art could make and use the invention by following the disclosure.
This disclosure is published as part of the patent document, providing
the benefit of the information to the public at large and allowing
anyone to practice the invention after the expiration of the exclusive
rights in the patented invention. In the rationale of the patent system,
disclosure of the invention is the public's quid pro quo for granting the
inventor exclusive rights.
But quite apart from such public benefits to disclosure is a private
benefit for negotiation and licensing transactions. The publication of
the invention disclosure in a patent places potential licensees or
purchasers on notice as to the nature of the invention, while the
exclusive rights in the invention prevent misappropriation based on
the disclosure. 26 Thus, aside from any effect they may have as an
23

Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for

Innovation, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INCENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Richard R.
Nelson ed., 1962).
24 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 277-78 (1977).
2' 35 U.S.C. § 112 11 (2006).
16 See Kitch, supra note
24.
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incentive to investment or any benefit due to the increase in public
knowledge, patents are expected to lower transaction costs between
firms by avoiding the information disclosure stand-off that may occur
under purely contractual disclosures.
However, the public information function of patents remains
troublesome.
The corpus of published patent disclosures
unquestionably provides a valuable technical library to the public.
But careful observers of the patent system have long been aware of a
27
paradox in the patent disclosure rationale. The exclusive rights in a
patent are only valuable in comparison to the patent holder's next
best alternative, which is trade secrecy. Patent protection lasts for a
little less than twenty years, but trade secrecy lasts so long as the
invention remains generally unknown - essentially, so long as it is
not independently recreated or reverse engineered by another. A
rational innovator would prefer perpetual protection to twenty years
of protection, and so would presumably opt for trade secrecy if the
invention can be maintained as a secret. This in turn implies that the
rational innovator will opt for a patent only when the invention
cannot be maintained as a secret. Or, in other words, patents only
disclose information which would have become public anyway.
Where investment methods are concerned, this problem is even
more troubling.
On a strong theory of the efficient market,
information about investment strategies will by their very
implementation be communicated via the market and their benefits
dissipated away by the response of other market participants.
Patenting the investment strategy, however, may legally exclude other
market participants from responding to the price information signaled
by the behavior of the patent holder - in other words, patents may
lock in inefficiencies that the market would have corrected. On this
view, the patent grant not only exchanges exclusive rights for
information the public would have had anyway, it also locks in a
market distortion for a period of nearly two decades. And since, on a
strong theory of the efficient market, investment strategies would be
impossible to maintain in secrecy, the incentive of a patent never
prompts disclosure of otherwise inaccessible information.
On a weaker view of the efficient market, the prospects for patent
disclosure may be somewhat less bleak. Patenting will presumably
still not be an attractive option for investment strategies that might
remain viable and confidential indefinitely. However, it may be that
27

See Richard H. Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret

Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH L. REV. 927, 958 (1974).
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the patent will prompt disclosure sooner in those cases where the
investment strategy could not be maintained in secret for seventeen or
eighteen years, but might have been maintained for a significant
period of time less than that. Risk averse business innovators may opt
for a certain seventeen or eighteen years of exclusivity over a lesser
period of uncertain use, during which the strategy might be
inadvertently disclosed or independently discovered by another (and,
indeed, patented after independent discovery by another business
innovator, in which case the earlier innovator will be excluded or end
up paying patent royalties to the later discoverer). We suspect that it
is in this class of investment strategies where patenting will have the
greatest effect, particularly for tax investment strategies. And so it is
in this class of investment strategies that we consider the effects of the
shift from trade secrecy to patenting, in light of the theory of the firm.
IV.

PATENTS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

Notwithstanding the indeterminacy of intellectual property's
incentive costs to benefit ratio and the dubious rationale for patents
on a theory of disclosure, patenting may have other welfare enhancing
benefits. Some commentators recently have begun looking at the
potential benefits of intellectual property grounded in the theory of
the firm, as
articulated by Ronald Coase and subsequent
18
contributors.
The theory of the firm argues that the size and
structure of firms will be determined by the relative cost of
transactions in a structured hierarchy versus in the open
marketplace. 29 At some organizational size, for some purposes, a
command and control type of hierarchy will be more efficient than
market negotiations. Firms will form and grow to the point where the
efficiencies of hierarchy are supplanted by the efficiencies of market
competition.
Modern theories of the firm have identified property rights,
including intellectual property rights, as important instruments in
28 See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized
Supply Firms,

Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Robert
P. Merges, A TransactionalView of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477
(2005); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the
Boundaries of the Firm (Univ. of Penn Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 0419, 2004), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=559195.
29 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
Early
work by Professor Frank Knight addresses similar questions. See F. H. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).

2007]

Patents, Tax Shelters, and the Firm

lowering transaction costs in the market.30 Firms may negotiate with
one another for production inputs and outputs, but the contracts
covering such bargains will not foresee every contingency, and
business partners may take such ambiguities as occasions to act
opportunistically. Property rights serve as default rules to allocate
resources when contracts are incomplete and parties behave
opportunistically. Intellectual property may be especially important
to such transactions, because unlike physical property, over which
control can be maintained by actual possession, control over valuable
information is surrendered as soon as it is revealed to a business
partner. The availability of such residual rights in a firm's assets
lowers transaction costs between firms, by providing some degree of
security when bargained-for deals go sour.
At the same time, property rights, including intellectual property,
may lower transaction costs within the firm as well." The interactions
of organizational divisions and personnel within the boundary of the
firm may also be costly and uncertain, leaving room for shirking, selfdealing, and other opportunistic behaviors. Property rights help to
ameliorate such behaviors, by securing legal ownership of the firm's
assets to the firm and allocating the fruits of production between
employee and employer. Intellectual property may be particularly
important to employee mobility, by defining what types of intellectual
assets may be taken by employees leaving the firm for new
opportunities and what assets remain the assets of the firm they leave
behind.
In previous work we have explored in detail the role of
intellectual property rights in lowering transaction costs both within
firms and between firms." Since Coase and his successors predict that
the boundary of the firm will be determined based upon the relative
cost of transactions within the firm and between firms, we have
argued that the optimal intellectual property regime must consider the
interplay between both sets of costs. In some instances, a weak
property regime such as trade secrecy will do too little to prevent
employees or business partners from misappropriating the firm's
knowledge assets. In other instances, a strong property regime such as
patents will overly hamper employee entrepreneurship within the firm
30 OLIVER

D. HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995);

David J. Teece, Profitingfrom TechnologicalInnovation: Implicationsfor Integration,
Collaboration,Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285 (1986).
31 Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004);
Paul Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005).
32 See Burk & McDonnell, supra note 7, at 576-77, 587-90.
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and negotiations between firms. Thus, we have argued that to strike
the proper balance of transaction costs between firms and within
firms, intellectual property regimes must be calibrated "just right."33
For some industries and their constituent firms, the optimal regime
might be a weak misappropriation right such as trade secrecy, but for
others the optimal regime might be a strong property system such as
patenting.
We have also suggested that a focus of particular scholarly
interest should be industries that are transitioning between
intellectual property regimes, for it is there that the effects of different
forms of intellectual property on transaction costs should be most
apparent.34 The adoption of patent protection for tax planning
strategies represents just such a transition, from a regime of
confidentiality to a regime of strong exclusive rights - effectively
from trade secrecy to patent. Even more than other investment
strategies, tax shelters are likely to rely on confidentiality to remain
viable. First, a stampede of investors toward a particular method of
investment that exploits an unanticipated outcome of the tax system is
likely to attract unfavorable attention from the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) and Congress due to lost revenue; either legislative
or administrative action may result to close the loophole.
Additionally, to the extent that the shelter is dubious or possibly
illegal, open disclosure may prompt administrative action including
prosecution, fines, or penalties. Because of these additional concerns,
the Service has issued rules requiring disclosure of potentially
problematic investments, not to the public, but to the Service itself.
The availability of patents as an alternative to confidentiality changes
the transaction cost picture in each of these considerations.
V. TAX PLANNING WITHOUT BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

The theory of the firm may therefore have a good deal to tell us
about the consequences of tax shelter patenting, particularly about the
effects of such patents on firms that offer tax advice and on the
employees of such firms. Consider first the structure of the tax
planning industry and firms that engage in tax planning before the
introduction of business method patents. This was a regime of weak
property rights - innovators in tax planning had to either rely on
trade secrecy or else let others use their innovations without

" Id. at 577.
',Id. at 636.
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compensation. What were the effects of that regime on the incentives
to innovate and to spread the use of new strategies? How did the
weak property right regime affect the relative attractiveness of
innovating and developing new strategies within firms versus between
firms, and hence how did it affect the boundaries of firms within the
industry?
As just mentioned, firms may respond to the absence of strong
property rights (i.e. patents) by pursuing one of two strategies:
protecting innovations via trade secrecy or just letting others take
their ideas. Consider the trade secrecy strategy first. A firm with an
idea for a new tax planning strategy may want to partner up with
another firm or firms, either in developing the basic idea or else in
letting the other firm develop modified versions of the basic strategy.
However, here Arrow's Information Disclosure Paradox35 arises: in
negotiating with such potential partners the innovator will be afraid
that if the partner learns about its idea, the partner will be able to use
the idea for its own without compensation. Innovators can respond in
two basic ways. They might refuse to share their ideas with any
partners and keep them hidden from potential competitors or else
they might negotiate confidentiality agreements with potential
partners before sharing ideas. Both approaches tend to slow down the
rate at which new planning strategies will diffuse among firms within
the industry.
Similarly, the lack of the patent option also affects the
relationship of firms with their employees. Its employees generate a
firm's new planning strategies, and the set of its existing strategies
exist within the minds of its employees. A firm trying to keep its
competitors from copying its innovations must worry about its
employees leaving to go work for those competitors, taking the ideas
behind the innovations with them. A firm following a trade secrecy
strategy will try to stop its employees from doing this. One way to do
so is to have its employees sign non-competition agreements, at least
where and to the extent that such agreements are legally valid.
Another way to do so is to have their employees sign confidentiality
agreements or in other ways agree not to use the firm's trade secrets if
they go to work for others. This in turn will make the employees less
attractive in the job market, as competitors are worried about what
the employees will and will not be able to use if they come and work
for them. Thus, in several ways a trade secrecy strategy will limit
inter-firm mobility of employees, in turn reducing the spread of new

"5 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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planning strategies across firms.
The other strategy that firms might follow, in the absence of
patents, is to simply not take any special precautions against
competitors stealing their innovations in planning strategies. Even
without such precautions it will naturally take some time for new ideas
to spread through the industry, and a firm may profit from its
innovation during the interval before competitors have adopted the
innovation as well. 36 Such reliance on "first mover advantage" may be

more attractive in the tax planning industry that in many others in that
the useful life of many tax planning strategies, particularly abusive
ones, is quite short. A firm and its clients can benefit from an abusive
strategy only until the Service catches on and shuts down use of the
strategy. It may be that this time period is short enough that few
competitors will catch on in that time, and hence taking expensive
precautions against being copied does not make sense. On the other
hand, non-abusive strategies may continue to be used for a very long
time, and so for such strategies, allowing one's competitors to copy
will be more costly.
The results for industry structure and innovation depend on
whether most firms usually follow a policy of secrecy or openness.
The secrecy strategy slows the diffusion of new planning strategies
across the industry. It also reduces employee mobility. On the other
hand, it probably creates a stronger incentive to innovate in the first
place, as innovators profit from their ideas for a longer time. This
effect is complicated, though, by the fact that would-be innovators will
be less aware of what their competitors are doing, and hence less able
to borrow ideas from them. Particularly with the trade secrecy
strategy there will be a tendency to relatively large firm size, as
employees tend not to move and start up new firms and as older firms
tend not to take on new ideas from innovative start-ups. For both
reasons, there is less incentive for persons with interesting new tax
planning strategies to go out and start up a new firm to develop,
promote, and use that strategy.
VI. TAX PLANNING WITH BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

What happens to the scenario we have described when one
introduces a possible new strategy for tax planners, namely the option
of patenting new planning strategies? The comparison to a regime
36 This is how markets work, and informational inefficiencies are corrected. See

Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AMER. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
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without patents depends in part upon whether a firm that now decides
to patent would otherwise have followed an approach of trade secrecy
or of no protection. We assume that most firms that decide to patent
a new strategy would have otherwise followed a trade secrecy
approach. The expense of patenting will be worth incurring only if
one expects a new strategy to be profitable for a long period of time.
As we saw before, where that is true the trade secrecy strategy is more
likely to be the more profitable approach as compared with no
protection.
With a patent, a firm will have less fear of competitors copying its
strategy, because if competitors do so, the firm will be able to take
legal action to stop the infringement. Thus, the firm does not need to
protect the idea via confidentiality agreements with its partners and its
employees or via non-competition agreements with the latter.37 The
firm will be more willing to enter into arrangements with other firms
to create, develop, and modify new planning strategies. Employees
will be able to move between firms more easily, both because they are
not subject to non-competes and also because they and their new
employers will have a clearer sense regarding which ideas can and
cannot be transferred with the employees from their old jobs."
These changes are likely to have a decided effect on the creation,
development, and diffusion of new tax planning strategies. New
strategies will diffuse across firms more rapidly, as firms are more
willing to share new strategies with business partners and as
employees circulate more rapidly among different firms, taking their
knowledge with them.39 As these new strategies spread across firms,
they will be modified and adapted into yet more new strategies. The
creation of tax planning strategies is modular and cumulative - more
complicated new ideas draw upon the elements of earlier, simpler
strategies. 40 There will also be a somewhat increased incentive to
develop new strategies as their creators are able to profit from the use
of their strategies by others.
As our discussion of intellectual property and the theory of the
firm suggests, this kind of change in the availability of proprietary
rights is also likely to have effects on firm size and industrial structure.
On balance, we would expect to see a move to something closer to the
37 See Burk & McDonnell, supra note 7, at 629-32.
38

See id. at 632.

39 See Arora & Merges, supra note 28, at
629.
40

On the general production process for complex transactional documents, see

Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Names in Complex Business
Contracting,77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 29 (2001).
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so-called "Silicon Valley model." Scholars who have studied the
development and success of Silicon Valley have argued that
innovation occurs because of employee mobility among firms, which
seems in turn to be due to the relative lack of non-competition
agreements and trade secrecy enforcement. 41 Similarly, in the tax
planning industry, the introduction of patents may better allow
entrepreneurial employees to launch innovative start-ups that have
developed new planning strategies. If successful, these start-ups or
spin-out firms will be able to license these strategies to others. Both

increased employee mobility and greater ease of contracting with
other firms tend to push in that direction.
There are a few counter-effects that could push the tax planning

industry in a different direction. For one, the standard short-term
effect of granting a degree of monopolistic power 41to innovators may
discourage diffusion to some competitors. Competitors will have to
pay a licensing fee to use a patented strategy, and some may be
unwilling to do so. If the patent holders could perfectly price
discriminate, this would not be • a 41 problem, but perfect price

discrimination is typically not possible.
More interesting and serious is the possibility that patents could

create an anticommons in tax planning. Scholars studying the
proliferation of real property rights have held that granting rights to
too many small parcels of land can create a "tragedy of the

anticommons" - the inverse of the classic tragedy of the commons. 44
Property rights are typically granted as the private ordering solution

41 ALAN
ANALYSIS
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HYDE,
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OF A HIGH-VELOCITY
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LABOR MARKET

ECONOMIC

(2003);

AND

ANNALEE

LEGAL

SAXENIAN,

CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND

ROUTE 128 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology

Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
42 Note that patents do not necessarily confer monopoly power. They
do so only
to the extent that there are no close substitutes for a particular patented good or
service. See Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. &
ECON. 31 (1986). Thus, the argument in the text applies only to patented tax planning
strategies which are unique and valuable enough that users are willing to pay a
premium for that strategy over competing possibilities.
43 Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) FairnessMatters
at
the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1867 (2003).
See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). The original
"tragedy of the commons" referred to the over-exploitation of a common resource.
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
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to the tragedy of the commons; the inefficient over-use of resources.
But too many property rights may lead to the inefficient under-use of
resources. In this situation, property rights are too fragmented, and
the transactions costs of negotiating with diverse property owners is
too high, to accomplish comprehensive development projects. Some
property owners may "hold-out" for excessive rents, inefficiently
frustrating beneficial development that includes their parcel. Some
follow-on scholarship has suggested that this same effect can occur
•
41
with intellectual property, particularly with fragmented patent rights.
In the case of tax planning, recall that creating new tax planning
strategies is a cumulative and modular process that builds upon earlier
strategies. If patents have a broad and vague scope, they may actually
inhibit innovation. A would-be innovator might find that many firms
hold patents on strategies that she could potentially use, and hence
infringe upon, in her new strategy. The innovator would then need to
negotiate licenses with the holders of the various patents. However, if
there are many such holders and if the scope of their rights is unclear,
negotiation may be costly and subject to breaking down. If these costs
are high enough, they may stop some innovations from happening at
all. The result may be less creation of new planning strategies and
more limited diffusion than in the absence of patents.4 6
An extensive anticommons problem could also reverse the
predicted effect on firm size. One way that firms may react to an
anticommons problem is to integrate the holders of various
complementary patents into one firm, thereby reducing or eliminating
the anticommons problem. 47 Thus, the effect of introducing business
method patents for tax planning strategies could conceivably be to
increase the size of firms within the tax planning industry, rather than
decreasing firm size as predicted above.
This sort of ambiguity in predicted effects is unfortunately
endemic when considering the effect of intellectual property law on
firm size and structure.48 The effect of weak versus strong property
45 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?

The Anticommons in BiomedicalResearch, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).
46 The effect of patents on market informational efficiency that we discussed
above may also complicate the analysis of innovation diffusion. Insofar as the basis
for a strategy's profitability is identifying anomalies and exploiting them before the
market corrects, then the inventors of such strategies are unlikely to license or allow
their use by others, because use by others will inherently destroy the profitability of
such a strategy.
47 See Burk & McDonnell, supra note 7, at 617.
48 Id. at 617-25.

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 26:981

right protection on inter-firm and intra-firm transactions is typically
non-monotonic. For instance, increasing the strength of inter-firm
property protection from a weak level initially leads to smaller firm
size, as more firms choose to do transactions between firms rather
than within. However, if property protection continues to increase
beyond an optimal level, the anticommons problem kicks in, and
further increases in the strength of property rights above that level
will lead to larger firm size. A similar effect, with the directions
reversed, occurs for changes in property rights that affect intra-firm
transaction costs.
What then are the likely net effects of introducing business
method patents into the tax planning industry? We suspect that the
anticommons problem is not likely to dominate, although this is just
an educated guess - we have no systematic empirical support for it.
Indeed, it is probably too soon in the evolution of the industry to be
able to tell, since the proliferation of business method patents is
relatively recent. That makes this an interesting industry to watch in
the coming years, to see how the changes in patent law affects the
industry.
If we are right about the relative unimportance of the
anticommons problem here, then the overall effects will be as
suggested above. Average firm size will decrease, and there will be
more innovative start-ups peddling new tax planning strategies. Firms
are also likely to become more specialized. The creation of new tax
planning strategies will increase, and the new strategies will diffuse
more rapidly across the industry.
VII. EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUSINESS METHOD
PATENTS

In the preceding parts we have considered the likely effects of
business method patents for tax investment strategies on firm
organization in the tax planning industry and on incentives to create
and market new tax planning strategies. We found that the possible
effects are complex and ambiguous. However, it seems to us most
likely that the availability of business method patents will lead to
smaller, more specialized, and more entrepreneurial firms providing a
wider range of planning strategies, and also to faster diffusion of the
new strategies.
For most goods and services, the normative evaluation of these
effects would be relatively simple. Insofar as most goods and services
that meet a market demand increase net social welfare, then a policy
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that leads to more creation and faster diffusion of those goods and
services is generally a good thing. However, tax investment strategies
may not be an ordinary service. There exists a fairly strong argument
that such strategies create a net social harm - they induce citizens to
waste resources on planning that lowers income to the government.49
Of course, this is to some extent a cost of adopting a tax system in
the first place. Taxation itself introduces distortions into the market,
changing the effective prices of goods and services, altering price
signals, and so changing the output of goods and services in response
to such signals.5 ° At its best, taxation aims to solve the problem of
underproduction of public goods - the same problem addressed in
part by the patent system. However, depending upon the placement
of tax surcharges, the distortions created by taxation may run the
gamut from intentional corrections for market failures, to intentional
subsidies for politically favored outcomes, to unintentional penalties
for otherwise productive activity.
If a tax investment strategy constitutes a deliberate governmental
correction of a market failure, or subsidy or incentive toward a
preferred type of economic activity, then patenting that strategy might
frustrate Congressional purposes by excluding investors from the
desired activity. This scenario seems unlikely to us, however, as
patents must meet statutory criteria of novelty and non-obviousness."
If a particular investment strategy has been openly contemplated and
debated by Congress, that public discussion likely renders it obvious
and publicly known, and so by definition unpatentable. In order to be
"innovative," patentable tax shelters are likely to be previously
unnoticed and probably unintended "loopholes" in the tax system.
We leave it to others in this symposium to argue whether nonabusive tax planning is a social bad. For this portion of our article, we
assume that it is a bad, because that complicates our normative
analysis. If you reject this assumption, you can ignore the remainder
of this part, and simply conclude that business method patents are
likely to have a net positive effect if our analysis in the preceding parts
is correct.
Given our assumption regarding the downside of tax planning,
does it make sense to use patent law as the preferred tool to
49 For further discussion of this and of the subtle implications it may have for tax

policy, see Philip A. Curry, Claire A. Hill & Francesco Parisi, Creating Failuresin the
Market for Tax Planning,26 VA. TAX REV. 943 (2007).
50 See HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC FINANCE (J. Backhaus & Richard E. Wagner, eds.,
2004).
" See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103(a) (2006).
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intervene, in order to dampen the effect of business method patents
toward increased use of new tax planning strategies? A simplistic
initial answer might be to concentrate instead on Service enforcement
as the best way to discourage tax planning strategies rather than
tweaking patent law to achieve this goal. However, a relatively simple
theory of the second-best approach 2 calls that answer into question.
Service enforcement and rulemaking are highly imperfect in their
ability to discourage inefficient planning strategies. Given such
limitations, perhaps it makes sense to use another policy tool, patent
law, to supplement the imperfect tool of tax law.
While this argument seems attractive, we believe that the initial
simplistic answer is the right one: the better approach is to
concentrate on tax law and on Service enforcement as the primary
tools to combat unwanted tax planning and leave patent law out of tax
policy. For one thing, business method patents will have some
positive effects. More importantly, even if the negative effects
outweigh the positive effects, as seems likely, there is just no way to
fiddle with patent law as applied to tax planning without bad results in
much bigger areas of patent law.53

Consider both the static and dynamic effects of making business
method patents available for tax planning. Start with the static effects.
Insofar as a patent gives the patent holder some ability to raise its
price above the competitive level, it will thereby reduce the amount
provided given the existence of the service. Normally that's seen as a
bad but necessary consequence of patenting. 4 Here, it is a positive
effect - it means that some people will not use a patented strategy
who otherwise would because of what they will need to pay for the
license to use the strategy. If we want to discourage the use of tax
planning, that is a good thing.
Another possible positive effect is on public disclosure of tax
planning strategies, which may affect the ease of Service enforcement.
As in the case of other trade secrets, the availability of patents seems
unlikely to prompt disclosure of tax investment strategies that would
otherwise remain confidential indefinitely. However, patents might
possibly assist in prompting the disclosure of tax shelters on the
margin of confidentiality, that is, investment strategies unlikely to
52 For an overview of the theory of the second best, see Richard S. Markovits,

Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3,
3-10 (1998).
53 See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying
text.
.U See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F.

COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

17 (2005).
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remain secret for longer than the term of the patent. To the extent
that this occurs, patenting may actually be beneficial in allowing the
Service to identify dubious investment schemes; the published patent
applications may be one place where tax investment schemes can be
monitored.
Of more consequence, though, is the long-run effect on
innovation and diffusion of innovation. We focused mainly on this
effect in the previous parts. Even there, we see some ambiguity. The
anticommons effect could reduce the amount of innovation that
55
occurs - which again would be a good thing, in the topsy-turvy
world where we do not want innovation in this particular service.
Thus, trying to limit the patenting of tax strategies may be counterproductive if indeed the anticommons effect dominates.
Of course, we do not believe that it is likely to do so. Hence, we
do need to face up to the likelihood that business method patents will
encourage more innovation and diffusion of tax planning strategies in
the long run, and that may indeed be disturbing. Under this scenario,
we must consider whether such a proliferation of tax planning
strategies can be curtailed through patent law. Recall our earlier
discussion of the slippery slope that led to business method patents for
tax planning strategies in the first place.56 Given the inexorable
transition from software patents to business method patents to tax
shelter patents, is there anyplace on this slope where patent policy can
call a halt to the slide? One could of course imagine attempting at
several junctures to hold the line. Moving from the specific to the
more general, one might try to hold the line against acceptance of
abusive tax planning patents, or against acceptance of all tax planning
patents, or of investment strategy patents, or of business method
patents, or for that matter of software patents.
But this strategy is doomed by what Mark Lemley and Julie
Cohen have in the software context called "the doctrine of the magic
words" - past prohibitions against software patents were easily
elided by drafting patent claims so as to avoid the term "software"
and instead drafting in terms of some other subject matter - the state
of a wrist watch or the function of a pizza oven, perhaps.57 The patent
issues just the same, and covers the software, but in terms that thinly
disguise the subject matter. This was the situation in the United

5 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
56

See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.

57 Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the

Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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States until the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
declared an end to the fagade in its State Street decision; it remains the
case today in foreign patent offices such as the EPO.18 Even under a
subject matter prohibition, one can always get a software patent, so
long as it is denominated properly in the claims.
Much the same result could be expected of attempts to block
investment or tax planning patents - avoiding such prohibitions
simply becomes a claims drafting exercise in avoiding certain
terminology. There is no particular reason that the claims of a tax
planning method patent need mention "tax shelter" or even the word
"tax." To be sure, the patent must disclose some utility for the
investment system, but so long as that disclosure is couched in the
terminology of investment rather than the terminology of taxation,
there may be little or nothing to distinguish the application from other
applications drawn to business methods. Detailed scrutiny of the
patent disclosure by someone having the relevant tax or accounting
experience might winnow out investment method patents that would
confer, but do not explicitly state, a tax advantage. But the Patent
Office examination corps has little experience in such matters, and a
given patent application typically does not undergo such detailed
examination.
Alternatively, since the interpretation of the patent statute by
courts and by the Patent Office has led to the "let it all in" approach
to subject matter, there have been calls for Congress to intervene, at
least with regard to tax shelter patents. 59 But legislation on the matter
is probably neither feasible nor desirable. First, Congressional
attention to intellectual property reform is at best sporadic and
tenuous, as there is typically little collective incentive to address such
matters - patent law seldom commands the attention of the
electorate or the press such that an enormous amount of political
capital is needed to muster the necessary votes. 60 At various times
various constituencies have raised a hue and cry over a range of
subject matters that they felt should be barred from patentability:
gene patents, animal patents, software patents, and many others.61
See Burk, supra note 12, at 226.
" See e.g., Editorial, Pay to Obey, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at 24.
60 See Burk, supra note 12, at 232.
61 See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting
New Animal
Life, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 399 (1988) (discussing opposition to animal patents); Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, How Can You Patent Genes?, in WHO OwNs LIFE? 117 (David Magnus
et al. eds., 2002) (discussing opposition to gene patents); Cynthia M. Ho, Patents,
58
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Despite what are often poignant and frequently compelling reasons to
bar such patents, these efforts have seldom resulted in any concrete
legislative action.
Moreover, on the rare occasion when legislative response has
occurred, there is usually reason to wish that it hadn't. The previous
history of remedial legislation regarding patentable subject matter is
62
not encouraging.
Congress has in the past enacted specialized
statutes to ameliorate the perceived shortcomings of surgical and
medical process
patents, precluding enforcement of such patents in
63
some cases.
Congress also enacted legislation to address the
unfairness of business method patents, carving out a prior user
exception to enforcement of such patents in some cases. 64 Neither
provision was well-drafted or considered, each is opaque and nearly
incomprehensible, and both provisions remain obscure and largely
unnoticed. Legislative attention to tax shelter patents, should there
be any, could well produce equally undesirable outcomes.
One thing that the Patent Office might conceivably be able to do
is to police the creation of overly broad or vague patents better than it
currently does. Even this, though, is not necessarily a good use of
Patent Office resources - most patents are never enforced anyway
and there is a fairly strong argument to be made for waiting to police
patents at the point of enforcement, rather than trying to guess early
65
on which might prove to be mischievous. More fundamentally, for
our story here, overly broad or vague patents would be a good thing in
the tax strategy area, given our assumption that tax strategy is a social
bad. After all, overly broad and vague patents are the source of the
anticommons problem, and in this area we would like to encourage
the creation of an anticommons.
VIII. CONCLUSION

We suspect the discussion in Part VII may be of most interest to
tax scholars and attorneys who read this paper. Given the general

DAVIS L. REV. 601 (2000) (discussing opposition to medical process patents); Allen
Newell, The Models are Broken, The Models are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023
(1986) (discussing opposition to software patents).
62 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1630-38 (2003).
63

35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006).

64 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006).
65 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U.
L.
REV.

1495, 1501 (2001).
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focus of most tax scholars on trying to discourage too much use of tax
investment strategies, encouraging such strategies through patent
policy does seem rather odd. However, for the reasons we have
catalogued, it is probably not feasible to do much about this from the
standpoint of patent law. So long as the courts remain committed to
recognizing business method patents, then patents for tax investment
strategies are here to stay. Both tax and investment professionals and
the Service are simply going to have to deal with the consequences.
Of most interest to us is how tax and investment professionals are
likely to respond and in particular how those responses will affect
business and industrial organization in their industry. We have shown
that business method patents may set in motion a variety of effects
that point in differing directions. However, the most likely net effects
are that the availability of business method patents for tax investment
strategies will lead to smaller, more specialized, and entrepreneurial
firms in the business of tax planning and will result in more new
planning strategies which will diffuse more quickly.
Business method patents obviously raise issues well outside the
field of tax planning. All areas of the legal, accounting, and investing
professions are potentially affected by this development.
The
theoretical apparatus we have applied in this article to the field of tax
planning can be used and tested more broadly to help consider the
broader effects of business method patents. While exploration of
those effects is an important and interesting undertaking, we leave
that for another day.

